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Financial crisis, economic crisis and individual households’ income and savings crisis.
Summary
The world’s financial  crisis  happened in 2008, but the U.S. individual  households’ income and 
savings crisis happened before that:  the latter one was already at crisis point in 2005 and 2006.
The key of any analysis  about the households’ income and savings crisis  should start  with the 
distinction between equity (=savings) accumulated out of an individual household’s own income 
and equity (=savings) provided by other households to the individual household as a supplement to 
an individual household’s own income and savings. In the case of the purchase of a home: is the 
outside equity helping to increase the volume of new housings starts or does it increase the price 
level of all homes above the CPI inflation level? In the latter case the outside equity reduces the 
value of the own equity. This is not because the asset has not increased in price on the open market, 
but because the savings out of income have a lower value to acquire such an asset. If incomes 
increase with CPI inflation and house prices increase at a faster rate, than for every new home one 
needs more equity, thereby reducing the value of the savings as compared to the previous period. If  
the costs of the outside savings go up due to a central bank’s increase in interest rates, especially 
when the home owner is on a variable interest rate mortgage, the value of the equity out of the 
owner’s own income drops further.
This value reduction in own equity is a gradual process; in the U.S. it happened over de period 
2000-2006. In 2005-2006 65.5% of all  outside equity in U.S. homes was used to inflate  house 
prices over the CPI rate.  The individual  households’ income and savings crisis  had reached its 
breaking point.
.
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1. The statistical evidence of own and outside equity in homes
Over  the  period  2000-2006  in  the  United  States  the  combined  mortgage  debt  of  individual 
households increased from $4.814 trillion as per the year-end 2000 till $9.874 trillion as per the end 
of  2006,  an  increase  of  105.1%. Over  the  same period  the  median  income level  of  individual  
households moved up in nominal terms from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 2006, an increase of 
14.75%. If one takes into account the increase in the number of individual households from 104.705 
million  in  the  year  2000 till  114.384 million  in  2006 than the  average  amount  of  outstanding 
mortgage debt moved up from $45,977 in 2000 till $86,323 in 2006; an increase of 87.75%. The 
conclusion can be drawn that mortgage debt expanded by a factor practically six times faster than 
medium income levels.
Table 1 illustrates how own equity became worth less and less in income terms.
Table 1: U.S.  Mortgages  outstanding 1996-2008,  annual increments in mortgage amounts, 
house price changes and consumer price inflation levels.
Year ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 07 ‘08
Total U.S.
Mortgage
portfolio
x US $
trillion
3.54 3.75 4.05 4.43 4.81 5.30 5.98 6.83 7.81 8.91 9.90 10.58 10.5
Year on
Year
increase
x US$
billion
House
Price
Inflation
% y.o.y
CPI
Inflation
% y.o.y
Excess
HPI over
CPI %
218
2.24
2.95
-0.7
216
5.10
2.29
2.81
301
4.61
1.53
3.08
377
5.81
2.16
3.65
383
7.67
3.25
4.42
507
6.04
2.77
3.27
680
6.48
1.56
4.92
850
7.29
2.23
5.06
944
11.08
2.59
8.49
1099
10.44
3.28
7.16
990
3.33
3.12
0.21
683
-1.95
2.77
-4.72
-57
-13.3
3.70
-17
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Table 2 shows the pre and post 2006 developments in the volume of housing starts in the U.S.
Table 2: U.S. annual new housing starts1 per 1 July, seasonally adjusted over the period 2000-
2013
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
2000 1463 2007 1354
2001 1670 2008  923
2002 1655 2009  594
2003 1897 2010  546
2004 2002 2011  623
2005 2054 2012  741
2006 1737 2013 (1 August)  883 (annualised)
Table 3 shows how outside equity has pushed up house prices and reduced the value of own equity.
Table 3: U.S. Net new mortgage amounts divided by new housing starts for the period 1996-
2007 and same housing starts and average mortgage amounts on a CPI based basis (1996 = 
100)
Year Housing
Starts x
million
Increase in
Mortgage 
amount U.S. $ x 
billion
Average increase
Per new House
U.S. $
Average
Per new House
On CPI base
(1996 = 100)
1996 1.472 218 148,098 148,098
1997 1.437 216 150,313 152,467
1998 1.698 301 177,267 154,800
1999 1.669 377 225,883 158,143
2000 1.463 383 261,791 163,282
2001 1.670 507 303,593 167,806
2002 1.655 680 410,876 170,424
2003 1.897 850 448,076 174,224
2004 2.002 944 471,528 178,737
2005 2.054 1,099 535,053 184,599
2006 1.737 990 569,948 190,359
2007 1.354 683 504,431 195,632
2008   .923 - 57 negative 202,870
1996 can be regarded as a good base year for the purpose of comparing the value of outside equity 
with own equity as the increase in mortgage amounts did not lead to an excess price increase in 
homes over CPI level. One may note that in 2005-2006 the outside equity was used to increase 
house prices to the extent of 65.5% of the increased mortgage amounts. The process started already 
in 1998-1999, but really took off in 2000 and subsequent years.
2 Sequence of events
1 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/HOUST.txt
5
                                                                  Financial crisis, economic crisis and individual households’ income and savings crisis©Drs Kees De Koning
The individual household’s income and savings crisis led to the subsequent financial crisis which 
was the outside equity crisis.  From the financial crisis the economic crisis followed.. In a stylised 
format causes and effects have been set out below:
Cause 1: In 2005-2006 U.S. banks originated $2.1 trillion in new mortgage loans, which was a 
26.7% increase in outstanding mortgage amounts over end of 2004. 65.5% or $1.38 billion was 
used to inflate house prices above CPI inflation rates rather than to fund new homes.
Effects:  $1.38 trillion  of  savings  were  allocated  to  a  use  which  did  not  create  output  and 
employment. They also had a strongly negative effect on the value of future savings as incomes 
grew less rapidly than house price inflation.
Cause 2: Over 2004-2007 about $1.2 trillion of sub-prime home mortgages were packaged into 
mortgage backed securities. The latter volume reached about $5 trillion out of a $10 trillion home 
mortgage market.  Reason: commercial banks could continue writing new mortgages without the 
burden of having to increase reserve requirements and investment banks could profit from such 
transactions too. Such mortgage backed securities were sold mostly to European banks and pension 
funds. Most of the latter took out credit default swaps, mainly sold by AIG Holdings, plus Ginnie 
Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in the U.S. Over 90% of sub-prime mortgages had adjustable  
interest rates, which led to payment problems when interest rates increased.
Effects: Banks offloaded credit risks to other financial institutions. Foreign banks scarcely needed 
to use reserve requirements as risks were offloaded through credit default swaps. Pension funds do 
not have reserve requirements as fund values are based on “mark-to-market” prices.
Cause 3: On August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas suspended three investment funds in mortgage backed 
securities  as:  “a complete  evaporation of liquidity”  had occurred.  The outside equity crisis  had 
come to the boil.
Effects: The securitisation process had turned 30 year mortgages into claims redeemable any day, 
any time and for the full amount. Short term savings were used to fund long term lending: a risky 
maturity mismatch.
Cause 4:  In June 2004 the U.S. benchmark interest rate was 1% per annum; by July 2006 it had 
been increased to 5.25% and stayed at this rate till August 2007. 
Effects:  As 90% of  sub-prime  mortgages  had a  low start-up  interest  rate  for  two years  and a 
variable rate thereafter, the increase in interest rates had a devastating income effect on sub-prime 
mortgage families and many defaulted on their mortgage loans, ultimately leading to BNP Paribas’ 
action. U.S. house prices dropped by 1.95% in 2007 and a further 13.3% in 2008; in the period end 
of 2006 till end of 2011 U.S. house prices dropped by 28.9% in value and in actual amounts by $6.6 
trillion. Share prices stopped rising in 2007 and the value of the share holdings held by individual 
households dropped by 40.3% in 2008. The total net loss in individual households’ net worth in 
2008  was  $12.6  trillion.  Unemployment  levels  surged  from  4.6%  in  July  2007  till  10%  in 
November 2009. Employment levels did drop from 146 million in 2007 till 138 million in January 
2010. The level has increased back to 144.6 million by December 2013. However the labour force 
participation rate has kept dropping from 66.9% in July 2007 till 62.6% in December 2013.
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Cause 5:  In 2008 as a consequence of the losses experienced by the financial  sector and as a 
consequence of a total mistrust in other banks’ financial positions, interbank lending dried up to a 
very significant degree. Lehman Brothers went into administration.
Effects: In the U.K. Northern Rock had to be rescued as well as RBS and Lloyds Bank. In other 
European countries bank rescues were also needed for ABN AMRO in The Netherlands and Fortis 
in Belgium among others. Some banks in Spain were strongly affected not through contagion from 
the U.S, but from own excessive exposure to their home mortgage market.
Cause 6: The shift in funding structure from 2000 till 2006 away from equity funding from savings 
earned  out  of  income  by  the  home  owner  to  the  use  of  other  peoples’  savings  led  to  price 
developments  in  the  U.S.  housing markets  which  far  exceeded  CPI  inflation  levels.  This  shift 
caused individual households to default;  the situation was made worse when interest rates were 
raised substantially. The individual households’ income and savings crisis preceded the financial 
crisis which subsequently turned into an economic crisis.
Effects: Governments around the world were faced with lower tax revenues than expected and they 
had to resort to a substantially increased level of government borrowings. For the Euro area GDP at 
market prices increased from Euro 9.265 trillion in 2008 till Euro 9.483 trillion in 2012: a nominal 
increase of Euro 218 billion. Euro area net government borrowings increased by Euro 2.174 trillion 
and unemployment levels showed a loss of 6,471,000 jobs over the same period. House prices in 
many Euro area countries still show significant losses. Wages increased generally below inflation 
levels.  Youth  unemployment  levels  in  many Euro  area  countries  have  reached  incredibly  high 
levels.
Cause 7: The reaction of individual households to the housing crisis was to save more by paying 
back outstanding mortgage loans. In the U.S. over the period 2008 to the end of the second quarter 
2013  individual  households  paid  back  $1.2  trillion  out  of  the  outstanding  national  mortgage 
portfolio of $10.5 trillion in 2008. This action was not taken in reaction to extremely low interest  
rates, but with the view to replace outside equity in the homes with own equity. According to the 
Fed’s Balance Sheet of Households2 the owner’s equity -based on market prices- was 59.7% in 
2005, it dropped to 38.4% in 2009 and thanks to the reduced level of borrowing increased back to 
50.8% as per the end of the third quarter 2013.  Notwithstanding repaying $1.2 trillion, 5.4 million 
households had their homes repossessed out of a total number of 53 million households who had a 
mortgage.
Effects: The double whammy of reducing mortgage debt by saving more plus the repossession of 
5.4  million  homes  affected  new housing starts.  Over  the  period  2007-2013,  8.714 million  less 
homes were built over the period 2007-2013 as compared to the 2005 new housing starts. The lower 
level of new homes built represented a loss in spending of around $2.5 trillion if one takes the  
average new home price at $290,000 as it was in 2005. Furthermore 5.4 million households lost all 
their savings invested in their homes. These 5.4 million households represented mainly the lower 
earning income groups as richer households could afford to buy outright.
Cause 8:  After 2008 individual households both in the U.S. and in the Euro area were hit by a 
perfect storm: On the income side: substantially higher unemployment rates were realised; wages 
grew (far) below the rate of CPI inflation for those lucky enough to have a job; the effective tax 
rates went up as Euro area governments increased their share of GDP from 44.8% of GDP in 2008 
till 46.3% in 2012. On the savings side in the Euro area: individual households’ equity position in 
2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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savings was and still is under severe pressure as the Euro Stox index dropped from 4,500 in June 
2005,  till  2000  in  January  2009  and  is  currently  still  only  at  the  level  of  3160;  individual  
households’ equity position in their homes is still under severe pressure with house prices dropping 
in  all  Euro  area  countries  with  the  exception  of  Germany and  Austria;  individual  households’ 
savings income has been reduced to such extent that below CPI inflation returns have been and can 
still only be earned on bank deposits but also on 10 year government bonds. The latter fact is due to 
quantitative  easing  or  in  the  case  of  the  ECB  long  term  liquidity  funding  in  exchange  for 
government bonds.
3 Conclusions:
3.1 Individual Households’ income and equity positions
1.  When many households notice that they need more and more savings to get onto the housing 
ladder as compared to income growth and when many cannot keep up with their debt payments, the 
effects on the whole society are extremely serious as cause 8 has just set out. Income losses and 
equity losses follow. Over the period 2002-2006 $2.9 trillion out of the $9.9 trillion or 29.3% of the 
equity provided by other households for the use of home buying was used to inflate house prices in 
the U.S. over CPI inflation levels. By 2005-2006 this percentage had moved up to 65.5%. Such shift 
in the use of savings is counterproductive as subsequent events have shown.
In a recent paper: “Do savings promote or hamper economic growth? The Euro area example”.3 I 
have  made  the  distinction  between  economic  savings  -those  savings  that  help  output  and 
employment growth- and financial savings -those that do not do so-. 
The data provided by the Fed on the Balance Sheet of Households4 uses market prices for assessing 
home values and not CPI inflation corrected house prices. If both market prices and CPI inflation 
based house prices would have been used than the gap between own equity and outside equity 
would have shown up. With the current method of market prices only after the housing crash did the 
equity loss on homes show up in the statistics. 
2. Apart from the allocation of equity to a home, most individual households also own equity in a  
pension fund and some own cash, shares and bonds, the latter two in companies and for bonds in 
corporate and government bonds. The allocation of savings to shares follows -at times- the same 
pattern as for the housing market. As governments are non-profit oriented households they do not 
have their own equity, but use only funds which have been provided by the collective of individual  
households. Government debt outstanding for longer than a year does no longer contribute to output 
and employment growth. It is a financial use of savings. It represents a claim on future incomes of 
individual households.
3.2 Interest rates
3. The interest rate instrument is a blunt instrument as it does not distinguish between the various 
uses of savings: the use of savings to fund government debt; the use of savings by the company 
sector  for  output  and employment  growth and the  use  of  savings  by  individual  households  to 
acquire a home to live in. in the form of own equity and outside equity.  In the U.S. individual 
3 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52533/
4 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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households and large companies started saving more after 2008, not because the interest base rate 
dropped to practically zero, but to protect their equity stake in their homes or businesses. 
The pre 2008 housing crisis was caused by a lack of understanding of how borrowed funds affected 
house price increases. The use of the interest rate weapon (base rates moved up from 1% in June 
2004 to 5.25% in July 2006) to slow down price increases in homes led to the wrong results. New 
entrants to the home market were faced with both the inflated home prices plus the increased costs 
of borrowings to get onto the housing ladder. What could and should have been done is to use 
macro-prudential  methods  -in  the above paper  a  “traffic  light  system” has  been recommended- 
which increases the costs to the lenders at  times that they lend too fast  and create house price 
inflation. This stops house price inflation but should not affect the volume of new homes build, or 
the  costs  of  new  mortgages.  The  Fed  could  or  should  have  known  that  variable  interest  rate 
mortgages incorporated in mortgage backed securities would lead to a high degree of defaults on 
such mortgage bonds once it increased its interest rates. The existence of Fannie Mae and Freddy 
Mac which help individual households to acquire 30 year fixed rate mortgages was forgotten in the 
run up to the housing crisis as banks competed to earn as much money in the shortest possible time 
period with the least banking equity requirements.
Companies benefit from low interest rates at any time. However demand for goods and services is a  
much stronger incentive to increase or reduce production levels as generally speaking labour costs 
and the costs of raw materials constitute a much higher percentage of total costs than the borrowing 
costs. Since the 2008 financial crisis, multinationals have accumulated huge amounts of cash on 
their balance sheets, not because of the interest rates on offer, they were at rock bottom, but because 
companies thought it unwise to invest part of their cash-flow as demand levels were lacking.
Governments have created an enormous maturity mismatch in their funding. Compared to the total 
maturity level of their debt, which in the U.S. is estimated to be over 70 years and for most Euro 
area countries is now well over such time period, governments borrow short and roll-over their debt
for the whole borrowing period. Individual households will not lend for 70 years, but the funding 
risks stay with the collective of individual households. The remuneration for households’ savings is 
not based on the maturity structure of the government debt, but on opportunistic price setting in 
interest rates. Governments do not decide to borrow less or more on basis of the prevailing interest 
rate, whatever the interest rate of the day is. Quantitative easing does not help as it lowers interest 
rates and replaces savings with money printing. There is no shortage of savings, but a shortage of 
disposable income levels for individual households. The unemployed, the low wage earners and the 
youth suffer most in this fight for survival.
If individual households save more when interests are very low, if companies save more under the 
same circumstances and if governments’ borrowing behaviour does not depend on interest rates, 
one has to wonder why interest rates are not maintained at a level slightly above the CPI inflation 
level.
3.3 Fiscal policy initiatives
4. The period since 2008 has witnessed the fastest rise in government debt levels apart from the war 
periods. This coupled with a government debt to GDP ratio of over 80% in some countries and in 
other Euro area countries of well over 100%, leaves no room for a fiscal give away to individual  
households or companies for that matter. Lowering the deficit levels is difficult enough, let alone 
creating a budget surplus to start reducing the government debt burden. What make economic sense 
however is to have all government debt based on an index-linked, a “CPI inflation plus” level.
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3.4 Other initiatives
5.  There  are  other  possibilities  to  shorten  the  adjustment  periods  in  other  ways  than  through 
monetary or fiscal policy initiatives. These have been explained in the above mentioned article: “Do 
savings promote or hamper economic growth? The Euro area example”. The article is available on 
the web: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52533/ 
The suggestions include economic easing, a traffic light system to manage the volume of lending by 
households other than the home owner, a review of government debt interest rate structure, a review 
of bank risk payment structure and a review of mark-to-market practices to assess future liabilities 
of pension funds.
23rd January 2014
Drs Kees De Koning
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